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Abstract: Across Europe, courts (both domestic and international) are increasingly
playing a central role in dealing with identity-driven conflicts across deeply
entrenched ethnocultural divides. At the outset, many of these controversies are
seemingly religious or cultural disputes, involving the interpretation of individual
rights such as freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of
religion. Yet if we scratch beyond the surface, there is much more at stake in these
disputes, or so this paper contends. Broader disagreements that confront majority
and minority cultures regarding group rights and the shifting intersections between
religion, ethnicity, and gender are played out in these judicial battles. The paper
traces the so-called “crisis ofmulticulturalism” in the Europeanpolitical rhetoric and
practice and highlights its impact on the de-juridification of cultural rights and on the
tendency to seek accommodation through litigation (typically by minority litigants
increasingly frustrated with the political backlash against their rights). It then
inquires into the prospects of this strategy, pointing out the limitations courts face
when adjudicating identity conflicts pertaining to minority groups traditionally
disadvantaged in mainstream political processes. These concerns are illustrated
through revisiting a number of controversies over Muslim veils that have been
resolved by the European Court of Human Rights. The paper cautiously concludes
that a shift towardmore participatory political processes ismore likely tomitigate the
decline of progressive forms of multiculturalism and consolidate minority rights.
Keywords: multiculturalism crisis (or crisis of multiculturalism), minority rights,
identity conflict, human rights courts
Introduction
Identity is at the heart of human life. This is perhaps the ultimate reason for the
enduring political and legal battles over cultural recognition and accommoda-
tion in contemporary democracies. Over the last few decades, minorities around
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the world have challenged the legitimacy of constitutions, laws, and public
policies on the grounds that they marginalize, fail to recognize, or are incompa-
tible with their cultural, linguistic, religious, or other identities. Take, for
instance, the debates in Europe and North America about whether the cultures
of non-Western immigrant groups, or of native peoples and minority nations,
should be explicitly recognised in the public sphere. Admittedly, a significant
number of claims are formally raised as exemptions to generally applicable
regulations in order to accommodate a particular practice or custom. When
granted, such exemptions might be represented as discreet immunities or spe-
cial arrangements permitted out of pragmatism (as a conflict avoidance strategy,
for instance) or as expressions of a weak form of toleration.1
But the intensification of these demands as part of the increasing politicisation of
identity issues reveals the limitations of this approach. Deepdisagreements regarding
the status and rights of peoples and of national and ethnicminorities,2 themeaning of
citizenship, and, indeed, the roleof thedemocratic state indiverse societies areplayed
out in those disputes. This impact has become especially apparent in European
cultural wars surrounding the right of Muslim girls and women to wear the headscarf
or other religious attire in schools and, more generally, in the public sphere; also, in
confrontations over the presence of religious symbols in state buildings,3 or the use of
religious or customary norms to resolve community or family disputes.4
The mobilization of identity groups, particularly of minorities, to advance
their claims is not new. It is rather the expansion of identity-driven disputes in
constitutional democracies that makes it difficult to deal with these claims on a
1 By “weak toleration” I refer to a non-principled form of toleration, which is more akin to the
modus vivendi version that emerged out of the religious wars. See MICHAEL WALZER, ON
TOLERATION 10 (1997), and the discussion infra Section 3.
2 By “ethnic minorities” I refer to groups with a common origin or background that goes
beyond strict family genealogies, which can also include immigrants as well as their descen-
dants (whether or not they are full citizens) to the extent that they perceive their identity as
closely related to these groups. Following Will Kymlicka, I assume that what can best help
distinguish ethnic from national minorities are their different demands. The latter are often
territorially concentrated and call for separate institutions in recognition of their aspirations to
self-government, whereas ethnic minorities tend to be dispersed and claim a higher role and
visibility of difference within the common institutions. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
3 In Europe, both the famous German (Bavaria) crucifix case, BVerfGE 93, 1 1 BvR 1087/91 (Ger.)
and the Italian Lautsi case, Lautsi and Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.,
(2011) (deciding whether religious minorities or secular families are entitled to claim the
removal of Christian symbols from public schools).
4 On debates about the status of religious law in the United Kingdom, see MALEIHA MALIK,
MINORITY LEGAL ORDERS IN THE UK: MINORITIES, PLURALISM AND THE LAW (2012).
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discretionary ad hoc basis, without a conscious principled philosophy that
grants legal certainty and enduring solutions. A broader public debate, none-
theless, has been evaded in many countries, particularly in Western Europe,
which provides the main focus for the following discussion. To a significant
extent, this is due to the enduring authority of an integrationist conception that
assumes that, ideally, ethnocultural minorities should assimilate into the domi-
nant culture if they are to become equal members of society. At the legal level,
this model stresses generality – that is, the need for common laws and regula-
tions – in order to preserve equality before the law and the unity of the legal
order. Regulatory and jurisdictional fragmentations are largely seen as
dysfunctions.
But beyond the lasting influence of this monistic, state centred model at the
domestic level,5 identity claims remain puzzling to legal and political analysts
who had assumed that globalization and democratization would significantly
weaken identity ties, thus favouring cosmopolitan ideals and reducing the
salience of ethnocultural strife.6 Instead, just as Western societies have become
more homogeneous across states and cultures, and identities are viewed more as
chosen than as innate, individuals tend to reclaim their value. Hence, the
prevailing narrative of globalisation is also fuelling a parallel process of increas-
ing particularism and legal fragmentation.7 This is because minorities of diverse
sorts often perceive the expansion of a globalised culture as a veiled hegemonic
project, which is not neutral but bears the character of the dominant groups. By
seeking a higher degree of political and legal autonomy, these groups try to
resist forms of “assimilationism”8 and assert their right to shape the institutions
that rule them.
In short, identity cleavages are more apparent in an age of intense inter-
cultural encounters that have accentuated the relative privileges or
5 On pressures on this model, see Neus Torbisco Casals, Beyond Unity and Coherence: The
Challenge of Legal Pluralism in a Post-National World, 77 REVISTA JURÍDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE
PUERTO RICO 531 (2008).
6 For a critical exploration: MINORITY NATIONALISM AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(Michael Keating & John McGarry eds., 2001); WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE
QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1994); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR:
NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP (2001).
7 JAMES N. ROSENAU, DISTANT PROXIMITIES: DYNAMICS BEYOND GLOBALIZATION (2003);
Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
8 Eamonn Callan, The Ethics of Assimilation, 115 ETHICS 471 (2005). Callan distinguishes the
forms of assimilation that globalisation inevitably brings about from “assimilationism,” which
expresses an attempt of the dominant group to entrench its power through a selective policy
intended to impose their culture.
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vulnerabilities experienced by members of different groups. Democratisation
and human rights have certainly provided a more congenial environment for
the proliferation of identity demands that are part of what Charles Taylor and
Axel Honneth dub “struggles for recognition.”9 As an effect of these develop-
ments, features such as ethnicity, gender, nationality, sexuality, or religion have
acquired prominence in public debates; they are intentionally vindicated not
only to reflect core traits shaping personal identities, but also to express ethical
and political commitments (that is, normative views and dispositions towards
behaving in certain ways, thus influencing agency).
To be sure, identity traits are social constructs, rather than biological
traits.10 Yet they retain an ascriptive component that needs to be acknowl-
edged – i.e., people are often identified and treated on this basis, whether they
want this or not. Identities and labels thus come to matter for ethical and
political life.11 Such identity-associated normative commitments shape the type
of claims that frame this inquiry, which seeks to revisit a set of crucial
concerns about group-differentiated citizenship that retain a central role in
mainstream political and legal approaches to identity-driven conflicts. These
dominant approaches, I contend, remain largely sceptical about expansive
conceptions of human rights encompassing not just individual rights, but
also group-differentiated rights aimed at asserting a communal identity or
culture beyond the private realm. The roots of this hesitancy can be found in
the profound influence that the classical liberal model of engagement with
diversity, based on toleration, has been able to maintain, despite the strong
objections raised by multicultural critiques. At least in Europe, the alternative
difference-based approaches that had started to influence the law and policies
of some countries during the late 1980s and 1990s seem to be losing the
political battle.12 Beyond the obvious impact of the post 9/11 climate, and the
unremitting economic crisis, one main challenge to counteract the renewed
hostility against minority rights has to do with confronting what David
Goodhart dubbed “a dilemma for progressives”13 – namely, the difficulties in
9 MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION”: AN ESSAY BY CHARLES TAYLOR
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1992); AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL
GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (1995).
10 See Kwame A. Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41, 2000.
11 Id. see also KWAME A. APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005).
12 Should state Infra (370–75) spells out the grounds for this assessment.
13 The expression had originally been used by conservative UK politician David Willets.
See David Goodhart, Too Diverse?, PROSPECT MAGAZINE, Feb. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-
britain-immigration-globalisation.
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reconciling the ethics of identity with other fundamental values, such as
individual human rights and social welfare.
The remaining analysis tries to substantiate this account and identify its
more remarkable repercussions in the legal realm. Among them, a central one is
the tendency of frustrated minorities to turn to courts and the increasing judi-
cialization of identity and cultural disputes. By exploring the limitations of this
strategy, the article seeks to lay the ground for a further reflection on the role of
judges in promoting inter-cultural justice and equality. The discussion proceeds
as follows. The first section starts with a brief conceptual elucidation aimed at
identifying two alternative lines of justification of group-differentiated rights
that emerged from the first wave of theoretical scholarship on multiculturalism.
I then turn to explore the roots of the prevailing discontent with accommoda-
tionist policies and the way in which it is impinging on the rights of ethnocul-
tural minorities. As indicated, the discussion focuses largely on the European
context, where the so-called “retreat” from multiculturalism adds to the increas-
ing perception that cultural minorities have lost the political battle. Following
I examine the legal impact of this backlash, stressing the de-juridification of
minority rights and the ensuing trend to seek accommodation through litigation.
The section also reflects on the limitations that courts face in dealing with
identity-driven conflicts. While minorities tend to over-estimate what can be
achieved by judges, important questions arise as to whether and how public
courts can engage the multifaceted dimensions of conflicts of culture and how
they can avoid the reproduction of ethnic biases. The on-going dispute over
whether Muslim girls and women should have the right to wear traditional
headscarves in public spaces is taken as a topical example to illuminate the
complexities of minority litigation. The concluding section cautiously reclaims
the central role of the political space as a more promising venue for tackling the




As explained, the so-called “politicization of identity” brings to the fore political
demands that people raise not merely as individuals, but as bearers of a
particular group identity. Regardless of how it is formed or changed, identity
has a crucial impact on people’s life. Acknowledging its social and psychologi-
cal effects is therefore crucial to comprehend why individuals usually care about
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their attachments and, therefore, why identity becomes morally and politically
relevant.
Liberal democratic theories, however, have been criticised for failing to take
multiculturalism (and the demands of identity) seriously, seeking to construct a
state that ignores the constitutive attachments and identities of citizens and
relies, instead, on a homogeneous idea of citizenship that, in actual fact, tends
to be biased against non-mainstream groups. However, the term ‘multicultural-
ism’ is extremely fluid. Beyond conveying the pervasive fact of diversity (ethnic,
cultural, linguistic, religious) in contemporary society,14 it has accrued a broad
range of theories and policies that confer normative significance to identity and
cultural claims raised, most often, by minority groups. Throughout the 1990s,
normative multiculturalism emerged as a distinctive stance to confront conflicts
of culture and identity against the prevailing liberal model. The ground-breaking
work of political theorists such as Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, or Iris M.
Young emphasised that, while traditional liberal approaches had been produc-
tive at promoting democracy and counteracting socio-economic inequalities,
they had been less successful at overcoming cultural injustice.15 A central
contention is that states can harm their citizens not just by denying members
of minorities their civil, economic, and political rights, but also by trivialising or
ignoring their identities in the public sphere. This is the type of impairment that
Nancy Fraser and Charles Taylor identified as a failure of “recognition.”
According to Fraser, traditional debates on redistributive justice tend to conceal
this harm because their main focus is placed on identifying and remedying
socio-economic injustice. Instead, cultural injustice is primarily linked to status
hierarchies, which are not always reducible to economic ones but rooted in
social patterns of interpretation and communication, including cultural domina-
tion and stereotypical representations of minority identities.16
In the view of critics, the conventional liberal model of citizenship tends to
ignore this injustice by recreating a narrative of a single national culture that
condemns newcomers to a second-class citizenship and reinforces the disadvan-
14 Race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and language are the most prominent traits in defining
multiculturalism, yet immigrant and sexual minorities raise similar demands of recognition. See
KYMLICKA, supra note 2; TARIQ MODOOD, MULTI-CULTURALISM (2013).
15 KYMLICKA, supra note 2; Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the
Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250 (1989); IRIS MARION YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE (1990); MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION,” supra note 9.
16 Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in A ‘Post-Socialist’
Age, in THEORISING MULTICULTURALISM 70–72 (Cynthia Willet ed., 1998).
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tage of historically marginalised minorities. Granting group rights17 to minority
cultures, alongside the general rights of citizenship, is seen as key to remedying
such failure, thus offering a rationale for legislation and public policies intended
to accommodate difference and promote the long-term viability of minority
cultures. To be sure, the normative grounds that justify group rights remain
contested.18 But, for present purposes, it is important to distinguish between two
versions of the theory that remain in tension in disputes involving identity or
cultural claims.
The more conservative accounts envision the liberal quest for universal
human rights and objective principles of justice as misguided and are inclined
to prioritise group preservation (or “cultural survival”) over individual rights.
This justification is typically based on a view of morality as historical and
contextual, rather than universal. Ethnocultural groups are depicted in an
essentialist fashion, as the primary source of identification for their individual
members, and hence in need of protection. As a result, religious and cultural
conflicts tend to be portrayed as involving a clash of incommensurable, non-
negotiable values – freedom of choice versus traditionalism and so forth – and
cultural rights and accommodations are often defended from a relativist per-
spective. This picture, as will become apparent, seems to prevail in the usually
overstated popular myths about the perils of recognising cultural diversity.
In contrast, the more progressive variants of multiculturalism19 start from the
assumption that cultural and identity claims can (and should) be reconciled
with the core ethos underlying human rights as inalienable and universal moral
rights. While this conception certainly rests upon a more communitarian view of
the self as strongly influenced by socialization in a given context, its proponents
remain committed to the centrality of individual human agency and the indivi-
dual’s capacity of critical reflection (also about identity) and thus see multi-
culturalism as compatible with liberal doctrine. On the other hand, cultures, and
cultural affiliations and identifications, are conceived as fluid and, in them-
selves, do not provide justificatory reasons for performing legally prohibited
17 Here I assume that certain group-differentiated rights for minority cultures can qualify as
human rights provided that their justification is connected to basic individual interests that
members in these groups have in participating and reproducing their own culture (rather than
on some irreducible interests attributed to the culture itself). For a detailed elucidation of this
view, see NEUS TORBISCO CASALS, GROUP RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (2006). See also Peter
Jones, Human Rights, Group Rights and People’s Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 80 (1999); David Miller,
Group Rights, Human Rights and Citizenship, 10 EUR. J. PHIL. 178 (2002).
18 See TORBISCO CASALS, supra note 17.
19 I borrow this notion from Maleiha Malik, Progressive Multiculturalism: Minority Women and
Cultural Diversity, 17 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 447 (2010).
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acts, for instance. What matters, then, is not the change, or eventual disappear-
ance, of a culture per se, but the nature of the process that leads to this result.
The point is to ensure that members of minority cultures are not coerced to
assimilate or to give up their commitments and efforts to preserve their institu-
tions or languages. Finally, progressive defences of multiculturalism typically
reject the more radical relativist framework, placing the accent on the need to
take cultural pluralism and inter-group equality seriously.
The justification of the rights of minority cultures by Will Kymlicka, prob-
ably the leading theorist of multiculturalism, provides a good illustration,20 as it
recasts the recognition of difference as a necessary implication, rather than as a
negation, of the commitment to autonomy. Other influential scholars justify the
public accommodation of difference on an equality argument, understood not
just as equality of opportunity, but as an equal concern and respect for all
groups that compose a society.21 Iris Young’s defence of a “politics of difference”
goes further in characterising the invisibility, misrecognition, or false represen-
tation of minority identities as a form of oppression, to the extent that it
contributes to establishing the dominant group experience and culture as the
norm.22
In short, the distinctive feature of this conception has to do with its aspira-
tion to a higher degree of inclusion in shaping the public space.23 For instance,
the relevance of multiculturalism in an inclusive educational system is justified
in order to balance the legitimate claims to diversity (and the significance of
identity recognition) with fostering a sense of common belonging. The defence is
thus not based upon an essentialist representation of groups, nor on a commit-
ment to their survival as separate entities, but rather on the need of identifying
and confronting the relations of domination embedded in social relations and in
political structures. Overall, these progressive versions of multiculturalism offer
a new grammar to assess the ethics of the broad range of identity demands
20 Participation in a “societal culture,” Kymlicka argues, provides the tools for understanding
cultural narratives and values, and this, in itself, is a precondition for making meaningful
choices about how to lead one’s life. Hence cultures (and cultural survival) are instrumentally
crucial for individual freedom, and therefore need to be protected, but not intrinsically valued.
See KYMLICKA, supra note 2. Similarly, Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the
Right to Culture, 61 SOC. RESEARCH 491 (1994); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-
Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 446 (1990).
21 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICA LAW
(1990).
22 YOUNG, supra note 15, at 39.
23 See MODOOD, supra note 14; BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL
DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY (2000).
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earlier described. Its proponents commonly subscribe to a vision of the political
community based on a commitment to recognising, rather than transcending,
particularity.
Identity Claims, Multiculturalism, and Human
Rights: An Incomplete Recognition
In 2001, Kymlicka identified a growing consensus over what he identified as
“liberal culturalism,”24 an expression denoting the progressive forms of multi-
culturalism described, implying that the case for the rights of minority cultures
had been successfully established: “The more cases we study,” he wrote, “the
stronger is the claim that ethnocultural justice cannot be secured by a regime of
common rights.”25 In his view, normative multiculturalism had won the day by
successfully challenging the prevailing (individualist and homogeneous) human
rights paradigm.
Yet, the implementation of the theoretical consensus perceived by Kymlicka
has proved elusive. Thus, the remarkable turn in the political theory of the last
two decades has not had the profound institutional impact that proponents of
progressive multiculturalism might have expected. Both domestically and inter-
nationally, there has been little positive recognition of the rights of minority
cultures as collective or group rights (beyond the common human and citizen-
ship rights) capable of producing binding effects. Certainly, constitutional and
international human rights norms have played a crucial part in providing a
framework for the claims of minority cultures. However, beyond rhetorical
allusion to the value of cultural diversity and the general individual right to
take part in cultural life,26 it is dubious that cultural rights have been fully
incorporated in International Human Rights Law as a distinctive legal category
involving group differentiated entitlements and tangible state duties.27 Even
24 Kymlicka compresses in this term both liberal forms of immigrant multiculturalism and of
self-government rights for minority nations and indigenous peoples. See KYMLICKA, supra note
6, at 9, 42.
25 Id. at 47.
26 See Committee on Economic and Social Rights, General Comment 21, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21
(Dec. 21, 2009).
27 On the limited number of rights attributed directly to groups by international law norms, see
CARL WELLMAN, THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2011).
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though efforts have been made to develop international standards of minority
protection and to codify multiculturalism,28 most of these standards retain a
semi-legal character – they are rather “soft law” regulations or “best practices,”
which remain largely unenforceable. Besides, the codification of cultural rights
retains a strong individualist outlook – rights are formally conferred upon
individuals – and many provisions are interpreted merely as negative rights of
group members, rather than involving state positive action. As the group dimen-
sion of these claims tends to be neglected,29 in practice, claims of culture are
frequently reduced to individual civil and political rights, such as freedom of
association or religion, as these rights offer a safer site to claimants. Only the
increasing recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples constitutes a signifi-
cant exception to this pattern, due, perhaps, to the recognition of the need to
confront historical injustices.30 On the other hand, a very small number of states
have incorporated explicit references to multiculturalism or to minority rights in
their constitutions.31
However, the partial juridification (and, in particular, the limited entrench-
ment of the rights of ethnocultural minorities in instruments such as constitu-
tions or human rights regulations) is perhaps not yet indicative of the lack of
impact of normative multiculturalism. As Kymlicka himself acknowledges,32
28 For analyses, see PHILIP ALSTON, PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (2001); PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991); MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A
REVIEW OF THE WORK AND STANDARDS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Patrick Thornberry & Maria
Estebenez eds., 2004); MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
PATRICK THORNBERRY (2005).
29 Cultural rights have recently attracted greater interest, but most studies use the notion
largely as an umbrella for different individual rights related to culture. See CULTURAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008); CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A
FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell
eds., 2002); Laura Reidel, What are Cultural Rights? Protecting Groups with Individual Rights, 9
J. HUM. RTS. 65 (2010).
30 The adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (G.A. Res. A/RES/
61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007)) represented a great achievement, as several provisions explicitly recognise
collective rights. The constitutional recognition of indigenous tribes is also a growing trend. See
KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM. STATES, TRIBES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF
MEMBERSHIP (2010).
31 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982) offers a remarkable exception, as it explicitly refers to
the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians; likewise, the
South African Constitution (S. Afr. Const., 1996.) recognizes the right to participate in one’s own
cultural life.
32 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS. NAVIGATING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF DIVERSITY (2007).
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there are limits as to how much those general legal instruments can capture the
relevant specificities of the claims made by minority cultures in different con-
texts. Instead, the increasing global commitment to multiculturalism and min-
ority rights can be perceived through the expansion of policies intended to
accommodate multiple identities in the public realm. And, indeed, those policies
had gained considerable ground throughout the late 1980s and 1990s in multi-
ethnic and multi-national democracies such as Canada, Britain, or the
Netherlands. Initially, this development came about to face up to the need of
integrating new waves of postcolonial migration without drawing on purely
assimilationist strategies; on the other hand, a number of countries have
adopted asymmetrical forms of federalism (or models of shared sovereignty) in
order to accommodate their linguistic and national minorities.33
The Backlash against Multiculturalism: Dissecting the Roots
of Discontent
Nevertheless, as a number of sociologists and political analysts have increas-
ingly noticed,34 the last decade has witnessed a retreat in this accommodationist
trend, affecting a variety of programmes and regulations aimed at institutiona-
lising diversity and promoting a difference-based model of integration. As a
political trend, the backlash against multiculturalism is especially noticeable in
Europe,35 where the model has come under intense pressure in countries that
had (officially or semi-officially) recognized and granted specific entitlements to
minority cultures. The case of the Netherlands, where publicly supported multi-
culturalist programmes had been central since the 1980s, has come to epitomize
the main patterns of a broader shift. The model started to be under pressure in
the late 1990s, when the growing presence of non-Western immigrant commu-
nities, especially Muslim minorities, came to be represented as a threat. Initially,
the critique of both immigration and multiculturalism by a number of influential
public intellectuals helped to validate the growing popular dissatisfaction,
33 For a comparative assessment of this trend, see MICHEL SEYMOUR & ALAIN G. GAGNON,
MULTINATIONAL FEDERALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2012).
34 See, e.g., Christian Joppke, The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and
Policy, 55 BRIT. J. SOCIOLOGY 237 (2004); DEREK MCGHEE, THE END OF MULTICULTURALISM?
TERRORISM, INTEGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).
35 THE MULTICULTURALISM BACKLASH: EUROPEAN DISCOURSES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
(Steven Vertovec & Susanne Wessendorf eds., 2009); Magdalena Lesinska, The European
Backlash against Immigration and Multiculturalism, 50 J. SOCIOLOGY 37 (2014).
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ultimately paving the road for the institutional setback.36 At the outset, discon-
tent focused on multiculturalism as a model characterized by an excess of
toleration that runs the risk of producing an ethnically segregated society.
Then, in an increasingly (post 9/11) hostile political environment, two dreadful
domestic events triggered the official endorsement of this narrative. First, the
murder of Pim Fortuyn – an independent candidate who came close to become
Prime Minister with a strong anti-immigration and anti-Muslim discourse –
during the 2002 national election campaign prompted the announcement of a
substantial reform of the immigration policy with the purpose of introducing
tighter restrictions to immigration and cancelling programmes designed to
accommodate ethnic minorities. The reform was seen as an essential step to
counteract what Fortuyn and his followers saw as an increasing Islamisation and
ghettoization of society. Two years later, the assassination of filmmaker Theo
Van Gogh37 by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim contributed to the legitimisation of a
broader shift of policy, even among those who had previously criticised the need
for reforms.38
The shift of discourse in the Netherlands is not unique. Across the continent,
political leaders of all signs have vociferously announced the “failure” and the
“death” of multiculturalism.39 There has been much political talk about the
perils of multiculturalism turning into a dangerous form of exclusion, as it
supposedly allows the proliferation of racial and religious ghettos depicted as
a danger for social cohesion and human rights. This is essentially what Trevor
Phillips, then Chair of the UK Commission for Racial Equality, claimed in his
controversial “Sleepwalking to Segregation” speech,40 delivered in the wake of
the 2005 London bombings. Since then, Phillips’ main claims about the real
impact of migration in Britain, and the supposed “unwillingness” of migrants to
integrate, have been seriously challenged.41 Still, by 2011, the newly elected
Prime Minister, David Cameron, openly defied what he called “state
36 See, e.g., PAUL CLITEUR, DE FILOSOFIE VAN MENSENRECHTEN (1999).
37 Van Gogh was murdered shortly after the release of his film Submission I, a publicly broad-
casted movie, which made controversial statements about Islam.
38 Ellie Vasta, From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to
Assimilationism in the Netherlands, 30 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 713 (2007).
39 See John Bowen, Europeans against Multiculturalism, BOST. REV. (2011), available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/john-r-bowen-european-multiculturalism-islam; THE MULTICULTU-
RALISM BACKLASH: EUROPEAN DISCOURSES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 35.
40 See Audrey Gillan, Ghettoes in English Cities ‘Almost Equal to Chicago’, THE GUARDIAN, Sept.
23, 2005, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/sep/23/race.world.
41 NISSA FINNEY & LUDI SIMPSON, SLEEPWALKING TO SEGREGATION? CHALLENGING MYTHS
ABOUT RACE AND MIGRATION (2009).
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multiculturalism” (meaning Britain’s long-standing state-sponsored policy) as
an “abysmal failure,” linking it to separatism and to the failure of providing a
common vision of society. Cameron claimed that a more active form of “mus-
cular liberalism” based on shared values was needed to counteract the rise of
Islamic extremism and so-called “home grown” terrorism.42
As it is apparent, a common concern unifying the growing anti-multicultur-
alism stance is that public policies designed to encourage positive respect for the
languages, symbols, and religious traditions of minorities have failed to integrate
their members in the mainstream society, creating “parallel societies.” To be sure,
the aftermath of 9/11 – especially the threats associated to global terrorism that
proponents of multiculturalism could not anticipate in the 1990s – and the global
economic crisis are central factors impelling the picture of multiculturalism as
“balkanising” the liberal state. In Europe, the London and Madrid bombings have
strengthened conservative agendas that support the hardening of immigration
policies and the securitisation of the relations between the state and minorities
(especially ethnic minorities) deflecting attention away from questions of inter-
cultural justice and equality.43 For this reason, critics tend to see this rhetoric as
the result of neo-nationalist and irresponsible xenophobic discourses that exploit
popular fears and economic insecurities for electoral purposes.
In short, the backlash against multiculturalism is typically depicted as the
preserve of neo-conservative movements at a time where politicians need to
react to pathological social fears provoked by the escalation of terrorist acts in
the name of Islam. The anti-multiculturalist talk also serves as a pretext for right
wing governments to evade their responsibility for the rising inequalities fuel-
ling the discontent of the middle classes, diverting the blame to immigrants
(portrayed as flooding an overstretched job marked and abusing the welfare
benefits system44). The nationalist imaginary of social unity and common values
42 A full transcript of the 2011 speech of David Cameron, UK Prime Minister, at a Security
Conference in Munich, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/
terrorism-islam-ideology.
43 Beyond Europe, similar shifts in discourse can be observed. Even Canada, once the para-
digmatic example of the success of multiculturalism, is immersed in heated discussions about
its relative merits and failures. See Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka, Canadian Multiculturalism:
Global Anxieties and Local Debates, 23 BRIT. J. CAN. STUD. 43 (2010); the 2008 report by Gerard
Bouchard and Charles Taylor (Co-Chairs of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation
Practices Related to Cultural Differences, set up by the Quebec government) summarizes the
reasons underlying the discontent. See CHARLES TAYLOR & GÉRARD BOUCHARD, BUILDING THE
FUTURE: A TIME FOR RECONCILIATION (2008).
44 See, e.g., http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/armutseinwanderung-cdu-streitet-ueber-fin
gerabdruecke-fuer-bulgaren-und-rumaenen-1.1855119; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
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has thus become a key discursive device to demand sacrifices from citizens,
such as shouldering the burden of the economic crisis.
Yet, a crucial feature of the growing anti-multicultural stance, at least in the
European context, is that it also seems to be winning the minds of progressives.
In the case of Britain, it was a Labour government (that of Gordon Brown) that in
fact introduced significant policy adjustments (such as a citizenship ceremony
for new nationals, involving an oath of allegiance to the Queen along with a
pledge to respect the rights, freedoms, and common values45). These adjustments
have been interpreted as a significant change of strategy, which adopts a
“securitisation” approach to ethnic relations and involves rebalancing human
rights with duties in order to protect society – hence, the insistence on the
notion of shared values and on the discourse on preserving Britishness.46 The
increasing introduction of citizenship tests is similarly perceived as an illustra-
tion of a major change.47
Surely, the shift could be interpreted as a mere rhetorical attempt by
anxious political leaders that need to counteract the rise of extreme-right and
populist parties.48 But this understanding cannot fully account for the reluctant
attitude towards minority rights displayed by many social liberals, radical
democrats, and feminists alike, who have not voiced a strong disagreement
with the official rejection of multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism, indeed, raises weighty challenges beyond the conservative
realm. One crucial issue points to the potential trade-off between supporting
cultural and identity claims and preserving social rights. As pointed out in the
introduction, this is well captured by what a decade ago David Goodhart
polemically identified as a “dilemma for progressives.”49 As the argument
goes, it is dubious that a very diverse country (as Britain, in his view, had
become) can be able to sustain the type of mutual obligations and the high
degree of cooperation necessary to preserve a strong redistributive system.50
uknews/immigration/10996721/David-Cameron-announces-immigration-benefits-crackdown.
html.
45 See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (UK), THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN (2007), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-governance-of-britain.
46 See MCGHEE, supra note 34.
47 For a comparative study of citizenship tests, see Ines Michalowski, Required to Assimilate?
The Content of Citizenship Tests in Five Countries, 1 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 749 (2011).
48 See Mabel Berezin, The Normalization of the Right in Post-Security Europe, in POLITICS IN THE
AGE OF AUSTERITY (Armin Schaefer & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2010).
49 Goodhart, supra note 13.
50 See also DAVID GOODHART, THE BRITISH DREAM: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF POST-WAR
IMMIGRATION (2013). Theorists of liberal nationalism have stressed that the sense of common
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On the other hand, multiculturalism has been pitted against feminism, and
against liberal secularism, too. Feminist commentators often regard identity
claims and cultural accommodations as suspicious because of its potential for
women’s oppression. Susan Okin originally raised this central objection in a
famous essay entitled “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” (1997).51 The argu-
ment, which can be extended to other vulnerable groups within minorities, runs
roughly as follows: insofar as group rights strengthen the boundaries between
communities (by demarcating spaces of collective self-government relatively free
from external interference), they could worsen the situation of their most vulner-
able members, namely, of the minorities within minorities.52 In particular, to the
extent that group rights are attributed to patriarchal groups that neglect
women’s rights, oppressive practices and collective self-understandings of the
community that reinforce female subjugation could be implicitly legitimised.53
There is a conundrum here, which Ayelet Shachar defines as a “paradox of
multicultural vulnerability,”54 whereby well-intentioned efforts aimed at enhan-
cing group autonomy and mitigating inter-group power inequalities can easily
lead to reinforcing intra-group hierarchies and aggravating the subordination of
vulnerable groups. From a human rights perspective, the anxiety is especially
focused on the risk of overlooking human rights violations (such as sexual
violence or discriminatory rules of membership) within minority groups.
A last facet of the dilemma for progressives concerns the potential of
accommodationist practices, and differentiated forms of citizenship, to jeopar-
dise state neutrality and the separation between church and state.55 Liberal
theorists of multiculturalism have paid insufficient attention to the status and
rights of religious minorities, as they usually start from a presumption in favour
of secularism that entails a form of state neutrality based on a strict separation
belonging fostered by nationality has been central in expanding solidarity beyond primordial
attachments. See DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995).
51 Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, 22 BOST. REV. 2 (1997).
52 For a discussion, see MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES. EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY
(Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005).
53 On the risk of ignoring internal contestation, see ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM
WITHOUT CULTURE (2007); Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 495 (2001).
54 Ayelet Shachar, The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Individual Rights, Identity Groups
and the State, in MULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS ch. 5 (Christian Joppke & Steven Lukes eds., 1999).
55 While maintaining diametrically opposed understandings of liberalism, Brian Barry and
Chandran Kukathas coincide in this conclusion. See CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL
ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM 12–15, 75–77 (2003); see also BRIAN
BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001).
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between the public and the private realms.56 The objection, as stressed by Tariq
Modood, is particularly compelling in Europe, where most countries contain
sizeable Muslim minorities whose demands often bear a religious component.57
Questioning the Retreat: Real or Just Discursive?
As it is apparent, the anti-multiculturalism stance is not homogeneous and has
been used in a multiplicity of critical discourses. As Alana Lentin and Gavan
Titley put it:
[T]he range of processes of social dissolution and varieties of anomie that multiculturalism
is held responsible for is scarcely credible (...). As a loose assemblage of culturally pluralist
sentiments, aspirations and platitudes, or more darkly as an euphemism for lived multi-
culture, it provides a mobilising metaphor for a spectrum of political aversion and racism
that has become pronounced in Western Europe.58
On closer inspection, most of the statements quoted above are based on a
caricatured version of multiculturalism that hardly captures the progressive
variants supported by its most serious advocates. The predominant political
narrative associates it to the conservative model as described in the previous
section, which seems to involve the full abdication of the state’s duty to promote
social integration. Kymlicka himself has criticised the idea of multiculturalism
“as a feel-good celebration of ethnocultural diversity.”59 Such a misguided
picture ignores, he says, the normative dimension of a doctrine that emerges
as part of the human rights movement60 and proposes a more inclusive model of
democratic citizenship in order to confront group-based injustices.
Furthermore, the dilemmas identified have been seriously contested in the
scholarly literature. First, the suggestion that, as a normative policy, multi-
culturalism leads to segregation has been authoritatively challenged as a myth
56 KYMLICKA (supra note 2, at 111) offers a good example, as he highlights the inconsistencies
of the classical model of liberal toleration as implying that, in principle, the state should adopt
a “hands-off” approach to culture. Yet his argument still assumes that the state can indeed
remain neutral regarding religion.
57 Tariq Modood, Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism, and the ‘Recognition’ of Religious Groups,
6 J. POL. PHIL. 378 (1998).
58 ALANA LENTIN & GAVAN TITLEY, THE CRISES OF MULTICULTURALISM. RACISM IN A
NEOLIBERAL AGE (2011); for a similar critique: Bowen, supra note 39.
59 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURALISM: SUCCESS, FAILURE AND THE FUTURE (2012), available
at file:///C:/Users/home/Downloads/TCM-Multiculturalism-Web.pdf.
60 Id. at 4–8. See also KYMLICKA supra note 32, at 88–96.
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reflecting a misrepresentation of knowledge. According to Nissa Finney and Ludi
Simpson, this idea, as well as the notion that there are “too many migrants” and
that minorities are “unwilling” or “difficult” to integrate reflects an unfounded
perception that these authors try to uncover using statistical data extracted from
the same sources on which such misperceptions seem to be based.61 Likewise,
there are grounds to think that multiculturalism policies are neither detrimental
to redistribution (and thus cultural recognition is compatible with preserving
social rights) nor to democracy. 62 In response to feminist concerns, a rich body
of literature has emerged that tries to move beyond the “multiculturalism versus
feminism” debate and identify specific problems and strategies to address Okin’s
challenge in a way that reduces potential tensions and conciliates cultural and
identity claims with women’s rights.63 Finally, the force of the mainstream
secularist critique is limited, as it tends to overlook the hegemonic or privileged
status that the dominant religion has retained in the mainstream cultural values
and practices and its enduring influence in law and society.64
However, debunking the empirical and normative underpinnings upon
which this set of negative ideas about multiculturalism is generally based
might be insufficient to changing a discourse that is gaining popular and
political currency. The context in which myths about ethnic relations and com-
munity cohesion emerge is crucial, and the objections outlined have a strong
influence in the widespread rejection of normative multiculturalism. As the
previous analysis reveals, those myths are often wilfully reproduced to validate
a shift of discourse in the face of growing discontent and rising populist parties.
The impact of such strategically oriented political rhetoric might explain why,
somehow paradoxically, the hostility against multiculturalism has even been
proclaimed by heads of state in Germany and France, two countries where, in
actuality, the multiculturalist model has never been adopted. Yet German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President Nicholas Sarkozy went
61 FINNEY & SIMPSON, supra note 41. For a defence of the model, see Banting & Kymlicka,
supra note 43.
62 See CULTURAL DIVERSITY VERSUS ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY (Philippe Van Parijs ed., 2004); on
the challenges that diversity poses to trust as a basis for democracy and possible avenues to
overcome them, see PATTI LENARD, TRUST, DEMOCRACY AND MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGES
(2012).
63 See PHILLIPS, supra note 53; Ayelet Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family
Law: The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 285 (1998); and AYELET
SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
(2001); SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM (2007).
64 See Harry Judge, The Muslim Headscarf and French Schools, 111 AM. J. ED. 1 (2004). For a
general critique on the separation between politics, culture, and religion: Modood, supra note 57.
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on to proclaim the death of multiculturalism,65 in an attempt to please the rising
number of conservatives within their own parties and to counteract, especially
in the French case, the growing popular support of extreme right anti-immigra-
tion parties.66
Still, against what the wholesale political discredit of multiculturalism
might suggest, the retreat has been questioned by several academics, Will
Kymlicka among them. The main contention is that the backlash described is
mostly rhetorical and limited in scope. Whatever the discourse might suggest,
empirical research shows that, at the local level, the diversity rationale con-
tinues to inform policy and accommodations, even if out of necessity or mere
pragmatism. Drawing on these accounts, the highly publicised retreat would be
more a matter of politicians avoiding the use of the word “multiculturalism” in
response to the shift in public attitudes towards immigration and religious or
national minorities – and favouring other terms, such as “pluralism” – than a
real change of policy.67
But commentators are divided over this optimistic interpretation. In Europe,
sociologists such as Christian Joppke have argued that the political retreat has
indeed resulted in a shift of policy, as it permeates the policy agenda in a wide
range of areas, such as anti-terrorism law, race relations, education, and access
to citizenship and welfare.68 For example, the trend towards adopting more
compulsory forms of integration into common national values or identity is
hardly refutable. And while citizenship tests might be interpreted as a symbolic
reaction, they do impose an extra burden to members of minority groups and
thus signify a step back into assimilationism. Other regressive measures have
been adopted that considerably limit cultural rights and policies, as in the case
65 In a controversial statement made in October 2010, Merkel misleadingly characterized
multiculturalism as an attempt to build a “multi-kulti” society consisting in living “happily
side by side,” which, in her view, had failed in making immigrants integrate. Sarkozy made
similar remarks in a discourse aimed at justifying bans on Islamic veils as necessary to preserve
secularism and French identity.
66 For an interpretation of French developments that stresses the crucial role of the popularity
of the National Front Party, see JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007). On the
relation between the anti-multiculturalist discourses and emerging forms of racism, See LENTIN
& TITLEY, supra note 58. On the emergence of right-wing populism in Europe, see MABEL
BEREZIN, ILLIBERAL POLITICS IN NEOLIBERAL TIMES. CULTURE, SECURITY AND POPULISM IN THE
NEW EUROPE (2009).
67 KYMLICKA, supra note 59; TAYLOR & BOUCHARD, supra note 43.
68 Joppke, supra note 34; and The Retreat is Real – But What Is the Alternative?
Multiculturalism, Muscular Liberalism, and Islam, 21 CONSTELLATIONS 286 (2014). See also
Lesinska, supra note 35.
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of national and linguistic minorities in Spain69 or of religious groups in France.70
The goal is, to a significant extent, to dismantle special legal regimes and return
to a model of “one society, one citizenship, and one law for all,” often grounded
on an unapologetic attempt at excluding certain identities from the public
sphere.
In short, there are reasons to remain cautious about claims that deny the
real impact of the retreat. Although disputing the empirical grounds for this
assessment would require a separate empirical inquiry, two observations are
relevant from the normative perspective that concerns us here.
On the one hand, speech is politics, too. Whatever their deeper motivations,
political discourses do have a practical impact, as they provide the grounds for
legitimising institutional and legal changes. Thus, the transformational potential
of what some scholars interpret as a mere rhetorical move should not be
neglected. However, unsound the empirical and normative grounds that justify
the anti-multiculturalism stance might be, the expanding public concern has
significantly weakened the consolidation of group-differentiated rights.
On the other hand, even if the rhetorical shift had not (yet) affected policy
substantially, there are limits to the more pragmatist version of multiculturalism
tacitly supported by those who question the impact of the retreat.71 Most sig-
nificantly, this is a version that falls short of the progressive account of multi-
culturalism, as outlined herein, which is principle-based and focused on justice
for minorities. Both the recognition of rights and the transformation of the
political and legal order to make it more sensitive to difference are central in
this paradigm. If, instead, group-differentiated accommodations are adopted ad
hoc, out of prudential or pragmatic reasons, then the politics of difference is
essentially tied to the fate of political action. Under this conception, minority
accommodations might be best conceived as “permissions” (discretionarily
granted and thus revocable) rather than as genuine rights (which would confer
“immunities” to minorities against the state).
Against this objection, it could be argued that local accommodations and
exemptions might still be based on a more principled account of toleration.72 But
the toleration model usually falls short of a politics of recognition and equal
respect for minority cultures. It requires the self-restraint of the majority, which
69 On the instructive case of Catalonia, see infra note 79.
70 President François Hollande has hardened the anti-multiculturalist discourse of his prede-
cessor, and has supported a law that completely bans the wearing of burqas in the public space.
71 For an extended discussion, see Joppke, supra note 68.
72 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 1, at 14–19; Samuel Scheffler, Immigration and the Significance
of Culture, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93, 111–16 (2007).
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can be fulfilled simply by enforcing negative duties – such as the duty to not
harm minority groups, or to avoid policies of forceful assimilation. But it is one
thing, say, to avoid forcing non-Christian religious groups, or linguistic mino-
rities, to give up their beliefs and languages, and quite another one to grant
them, as a group, equal status and recognition in the public sphere.73 Toleration,
moreover, presumes a hierarchical relation of subjection based on asymmetrical
power. Minorities are perceived as subjected to the state authority, an object of
regulation, which determines the terms of accommodation. That is why being
tolerated feels “uncomfortable,” as Leslie Green puts it.74 It often presupposes
an adverse judgment on a given practice or tradition that is accompanied by an
effort to authorise it that is neither grounded on moral acceptance or recogni-
tion. A toleration approach thus simply assumes the unequal standing of cul-
tural minorities in the mainstream political culture.75
Interpreted in this light, the legal adjustments that some countries made in
response to identity claims might have been part of a politics of toleration, more
inspired on what Jacob Levy dubs a “multiculturalism of fear”76 than on a “multi-
culturalism of rights.” If this is so, then it hardly makes sense to talk about the
multicultural retreat, as it would be more accurate to acknowledge that the model
has hardly been applied. In fact, the sort of unabridged rejection of normative
multiculturalism would be almost unthinkable if progressive defences of multi-
culturalism had really transformed the predominant legal orthodoxies. This is so
because demands put forward in the language of rights often act as strong
normative reasons that enjoy priority,77 thus generating “waves of duties”78 that
should be institutionally fulfilled in order to protect them.
A Limited Scope?
For the reasons discussed so far, the impact of the retreat from multiculturalism
should not be underestimated. Yet it could still be argued that the scope of the
73 For a rich discussion on the normative limitations of this conception, see RAINER FORST,
TOLERATION IN CONFLICT: PAST AND PRESENT (2013).
74 Leslie Green, On Being Tolerated, in THE LEGACY OF H.L.A HART: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND
MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Mathew Kramer et al. eds., 2008).
75 See also Forst, supra note 73, at 29–30 (discussing an alternative conception based on equal
respect).
76 See JACOB LEVY, THE MULTICULTURALISM OF FEAR (2000).
77 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1997); and Ronald Dworkin, Rights as
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
78 Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 3 ETHICS 503 (1989).
386 Law & Ethics of Human Rights
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:31 PM
retreat is limited, taking into account what progressive models of multicultural-
ism actually prescribe. In Europe, at least, the backlash against cultural accom-
modations seems to be affecting mostly immigrants and ethnic minorities,
largely of Muslim origin. And the trend towards political devolution appears
globally stable, which might call into question the gloomier assessments about
the retreat.
There is a kernel of truth in these observations. Still, conflicts such as the
one between Spain and Catalonia offer an example of how the refusal to under-
stand cultural and self-government claims as human rights can leave minority
groups defenceless against the encroachment of their rights and political status.
To a significant extent, the current dispute has originated in a re-centralisation
move justified through assimilationist discourses that deny the relevance of
difference and the need of accommodating Catalan demands for broader auton-
omy. This shift is largely based on the belief that the decentralisation model
adopted in the 1978 Spanish Constitution to accommodate national and linguis-
tic minorities has proved divisive, leading to an incremental dynamic of
demands. However, the setback on minority rights has triggered massive pro-
tests, as it is not merely symbolic but affects broad policy areas such as educa-
tion and linguistic policy. The growing perception that the central state’s laws
and financial regulations are being systematically used to encroach on the
powers devolved to the Catalan self-government institutions is, stirring secessio-
nist demands.79
On the other hand, even acknowledging the undeniable link between the
pressure on multiculturalism and the social perception of Islam and of Muslim
minorities as a threat, it is crucial to recognise that these are the most prominent
(and politically salient) minority groups in Europe. Hence, the backlash against
accommodations cannot be dismissed as limited simply because it mainly targets
Muslims.80
79 For a brief recount of these events, see Xavier Vilà Carrera, The Domain of Spain: How Likely
is Catalan Independence?, WORLD AFF. (2014), available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/
article/domain-spain-how-likely-catalan-independence. See also, Xavier Cuadras-Morató (ed.):
CATALONIA: A NEW INDEPENDENT STATE IN EUROPE? A DEBATE OVER SECESSION WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2016).
80 The anti-multiculturalist talk in other countries has also focused on prominent groups, such
as Hispanics in the United States and Asians in Australia. See Christian Joppke, Through the
European Looking Glass: Citizenship Tests in the USA, Australia and Canada, 17 CITIZENSHIP
STUD. 1 (2013).
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Rights, Identity, and Courts
De-juridification as an Effect of the Retreat from
Multiculturalism: Bans on Veils as an Illustration
The priority so far has been to trace the grounds for the current fragility of
progressive variants of multiculturalism. The persistent lack of consensus on the
morality of minority (group-differentiated) rights as human rights is surely
influenced by the elusiveness of the dilemmas sketched, which also explains
the relatively weak opposition to the backlash. In the legal realm, a notable
implication of the fall of multiculturalism is the significant weakening of the
process of juridification of identity (group-based) claims that had started to
shape human rights law in the 1990s. The normative aspirations of proponents
of multiculturalism have thus been deflated, giving way to much more local and
fragmented group rights regimes. This de-juridification trend displaces questions
of human rights and legitimacy, which had been key to the embryonic develop-
ment of an international legal framework for minority protection. As a result, the
more powerful groups in each state have the ultimate say on recognition and
accommodation.
While de-juridification significantly increases the discretionary powers of the
dominant majorities, it does not necessarily entail de-regulation. On the con-
trary, there is a growing tendency to regulate the boundaries of the settlement
between society, religion, and culture, which, as McCrea notes, “have to date
been a matter of socio-cultural convention rather than legal rule.”81 Far from
subsiding, state law moves in once social consensus dissolves and inter-group
conflict is perceived as intractable. In Europe, the proliferation of legal norms
that attempt to re-define those boundaries takes place against the background of
hostility towards minorities described earlier. The reversal of accommodationist
policies tends to be justified as necessary to preserve individual rights, social
cohesion, and the “public order”. This reinforces the oversimplified conception
of group rights and individual rights as mutually excluding categories; as it is
often put: “it is either your culture or your rights.”82
In the face of this dilemmatic depiction, the adoption of prohibitionist
strategies in order to target potentially threatening practices or customs has
81 Ronan McCrea, The Ban on the Veil and European Law, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 58 (2013).
82 For a general critique of rights-based approaches to conflicts of identity that stresses the
shortcomings of this framing, see AVIGAIL EISENBERG, REASONS OF IDENTITY: A NORMATIVE
GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF IDENTITY CLAIMS (2009).
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become more common. The polemic expansion of the so-called “veil bans”
across Western Europe over the last decade is particularly revealing of this
attempt at regulating contested identities and restricting their public expression
in the name of preserving individual rights but also the identity of the polity. As
is well known, a significant number of states (most notably France, but also
Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland) have adopted a varied range of legal
restrictions on the wearing of Muslim veils in various forms – from the hijab
or headscarf to the body-covering Arabic burqa and the more Afghan-style
niqab.83 To be sure, not every country has legislated at the national level; but
several regional or local governments have banned (or announced their inten-
tion to ban) full Islamic face-veils from certain public spaces.84 So far, such
constraints remain mostly circumscribed to specific areas, including state
schools, courts, public libraries, or government facilities. But calls to broaden
these restrictions are persistent, as polls show that the majority of citizens
support them. Most notably, in the case of the controversial Belgium and
French full-face veils (known as burqa bans) the prohibition has been extended
to all public spaces.85
To be sure, none of these bans are formally targeting Muslims as a group,
nor do they refer specifically to women or to the Islamic veils directly. For
instance, a French statute of 2004 prohibits all students in public elementary
schools and high schools from wearing symbols or clothes through which their
religious affiliation is conspicuously (ostensiblement, in the French formulation)
83 The word “hijab” comes from the Arabic for veil. Islamic normative sources prescribe that
women ought to dress modestly, but the female modest dress code is interpreted in a great
variety of ways. In Western Europe, a relatively small number of Muslim women understand it
as requiring a full covering of the body, with the exception of the face and hands; but what
most of them wear is not a gown but a square-shaped headscarf, which comes in myriad styles
and covers the head and neck but leaves the face clear.
84 Local and regional authorities in Italy, Germany, Spain, or Switzerland have approved
restrictions. In Northern Italy, several municipal bans have been adopted. In Germany, the
Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 2003 in favor of a teacher who wanted to wear an Islamic
scarf to school, but some Länder have banned school teachers from wearing it. Similarly,
although there is no national law restricting the wearing of veils in Switzerland or Spain, in
2013, the Italian-speaking Swiss region of Ticino voted in favour of a ban on face veils in public
areas, and the Catalan city of Lleida had adopted restrictions on full Islamic face-veils in some
public spaces, too – however, Spain’s Supreme Court overturned the ban in February 2013,
ruling that it was outside the municipality competence.
85 On the problems of such bans, see also the Resolution 1743 (2010) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe on Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, para. 17; and
Recommendation 1927, 2010, para. 3. 13.
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displayed.86 Accordingly, the ban also applies to the Jewish skullcap (or kippa),
the Sikh turban, and to any Christian cross that is too visible (as opposed to
discreet). The same observation is true for most restrictions, including the more
recent full-face veil ban in France. Its first section reads: “No one may, in public
places, wear clothing that is designed to conceal the face.”87 Hence, they usually
apply to “any group” and can potentially affect a variety of head garments or
religious dress.88
Nevertheless, the fact that the adoption of these legislative measures had
been preceded by a nearly obsessive political fixation with Islamic veils –
mimicked, too, in the media – makes it hard to see this prohibitionist trend in
a neutral vein. Even if the prohibitions are not openly targeting Muslim women,
they do have a particular impact in undermining their opportunities and ways of
life, thus putting them at a disadvantage in relation to the dominant social and
religious group. As noted by Muslim scholars, the headscarf is not just a
religious symbol, but also a genuine duty that Islamic Law prescribes for the
public social space.89 So, forcing women to remove the headscarf represents a
serious restriction of their freedom of religion and conscience, and also affects
their equality of opportunity in the access to public jobs or to pursue education.
If we look at this issue merely through an individual rights prism, the very
fact that the regulation of Muslim attire has deserved such an intense public and
legislative attention seems disproportionate. Actually, there are very few Muslim
women wearing full-face covering body gowns, such as niqabs and burqas, and
most of them interpret Islamic normative precepts as simply requiring them to
cover the hair with a headscarf.90 As some analysts observed with respect to the
first ban on veils adopted in France, wearing a headscarf in class was seen as
militantly anti-French.91 What the law incorporated, then, was not just a state-
86 CODE DE L’ÉDUCATION [National Code of Education] (Fr.), art. 141-5-1 No 2004–228.
87 Law no. 2010–1192, Oct. 11, 2010 (Fr.).
88 For a comparative analysis, see DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION: THE
ISLAMIC HEADSCARF DEBATE IN EUROPE (2006).
89 Shadid Wasif & Pieter Van Koningsveld, Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on the Headscarf,
16 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 36 (2005).
90 See France’s Ban on the Burqa: The War of French Dressing, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 2010, at
49, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15270861; Maurits S. Berger, The Netherlands,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN ISLAM 158 (Jocelyn Cesary ed., 2014).
91 Norma Claire Moruzzi, A Problem with Head Scarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political
and Social Identity, 22 POL. THEORY 656 (1994); Jane Kramer, Taking the Veil. How French Public
Schools became the Battleground in a Culture War, 22 NEW YORKER 58 (2004).
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ment on secularism or equality, but also the reaffirmation of French national
identity.92 The whole turn to regulating minority symbols and behaviour is,
therefore, part of the growing social anxiety about ethnocultural diversity.
As suggested earlier, from a jurisprudential perspective, it is one thing to
grant an exemption to a given group and another, very different question, is how
to face to the demands for differentiated legal arrangements that are based on a
broader discourse of recognition. As Modood states, Muslim’s demands are both
religious and political.93 This is because their identities cannot remain just
private, as their faith includes prescriptions that encompass a broad range of
rules concerning interpersonal interaction beyond the family and their religious
community.94
In sum, with its characteristic obsession to regulate the public manifestation
of religion, the spread of bans on veils illustrates the decline of a multicultural
model of integration. The complexity of the veil symbol highlights the intersect-
ing issues of ethnicity, religion, secularism, gender equality, and also fears of
terrorism, which cut across the traditional right and left divides. From this
perspective we can make sense of the fact that, for many young female
Muslims, wearing the headscarf has become a reactive form of asserting their
identities (rather than just their faith) in the face of increasing intolerance.95
Courts and Culture: Limits of Litigating Identity Conflicts
A second critical effect of the retreat of multiculturalism in the legal realm is
the trend to seek recognition and accommodation through litigation. As eth-
nocultural minorities see their status and rights increasingly threatened by an
adverse political climate, which they have little hope to influence given their
structural marginalization in the mainstream institutions, they turn to courts
for protection. Through this strategy, they seek an affirmation of what they see
as entitlements, and not merely as concessions granted out of toleration. As a
result, judges, rather than legislators, are playing a central role in dealing with
cultural clashes and identity claims that confront majority and minority cul-
tures. This raises questions as to whether the judicial sphere provides the best
92 On the negative association of “multiculturalism” with “exceptionalism,” see Kramer, supra
note 91.
93 Modood, supra note 57, at 385–87.
94 Id. at 387.
95 MARNIA LAZREG, QUESTIONING THE VEIL. OPEN LETTERS TO MUSLIM WOMEN 55 (2009);
Jennifer A. Selby, France, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN ISLAM 30–34 (Jocelyn
Cesary ed., 2014).
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context in which to settle these disputes or, on the contrary, it might exacer-
bate them yet further.
At the outset, there are reasons to think that the essential role of the
judiciary in protecting vulnerable minorities, which is usually invoked in objec-
tions to the counter-majoritarian critique of judicial review,96 places public
courts in a good position to assess the demands of identity. The judiciary, as
Hamilton famously claimed, might indeed be the “least dangerous” branch “to
the political rights of the Constitution,” as it has “no influence over either the
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society.”97 In the context of the political backlash described, the judicial setting
can provide a forum for public deliberation and visibility of minorities whose
interests and views are typically underrepresented or simply excluded from the
mainstream political sphere. Hence, the judicial mobilisation of minorities could
increase the opportunities for inter-cultural interaction and give courts the
chance to unsettle unfair systems, help inform public understandings, and
subvert the position of privilege of dominant identity groups. When rulings
(especially those that come from particularly prestigious courts, either domestic
or international) reflect an effort to hear the voices of women, or of racial,
ethnic, gay, and religious minorities, and to treat their reasons fairly, they
have a potential for helping to overcome dominant prejudices against these
groups as well as stereotypes of their members. Eventually, this might help to
generate a virtuous circle of inter-cultural understanding and higher social
empathy towards minorities.
But even acknowledging the transformational potential of public adjudica-
tion, there are a number of considerations that should moderate this optimistic
account. The idealised view of judges as impartial and almost infallible autho-
rities, who can act as a safe haven from majoritarian prejudice, underestimates
the concerns about institutional constraints and biases that might not just
impinge on the courts’ ability to protect vulnerable groups, but also undermine
significantly the required impartiality of adjudicators. Here, it is important to
recall that the composition of courts (both domestic and international) is made
up of middle and upper class professional elites (mostly male) that, in most
cases, are also members of the majority culture.
Surely, it could be objected that cultural belonging and political ideology do
not need to determine, and that they should ideally not even influence, the task
of adjudication. But there are solid critiques that challenge this idealised view.
96 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
97 Alexander Hamilton, The Judiciary Department, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 78, 590
(Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, & John Jay, eds., 2007) [1788].
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The more radically sceptical stance is associated with American realist theorists
who crucially pointed out that judges are ordinary persons, too, with a personal
background and an identity, and that factors such as their education, religion,
political views, and cultural belonging can influence their reasoning.98 Even
those who reject the most critical realist accounts against judicial impartiality
should acknowledge that the contrary ideal – a Dworkinian depiction of
Hercules (the immensely wise judge with full knowledge and unlimited time to
decide99) – remains a metaphor. There is a risk that the cultural, ethnic, and
gender imbalances that are typical of the judicial bench across Western democ-
racies affect impartiality, and that judicial decision-making ends up reproducing
dominant prejudices and biases. Although it is not possible to engage in depth
with the substantial questions that the lack of internal diversity in the composi-
tion of the courts raises,100 let me briefly elaborate on the relevant issues that
might affect the adjudication of identity and cultural conflicts.
The principle nemo iudex in causa sua – that is, no judge should preside
over a matter in which she has a personal interest – is regarded as fundamental
in democratic legal systems. Yet in cases concerning the assessment of minority
practices or symbols, it is not a direct or even conscious personal interest that
can be potentially threatening, but rather a more unconscious prejudice. This
can be manifested more subtly in processes of adjudication led by judges who
are typically male and belong to the dominant ethnocultural group. For
instance, such judges might simply attend less carefully to the facts of the
case, or display a lower level of “perceptual sensitivity”101 towards the reasoning
or arguments invoked by minority claimants. Although giving a proper norma-
tive account of this dimension of judging is a task that cannot be undertaken
here, the idea is well captured by Amalia Amaya’s argument that the practical
reasoning of a virtuous (decision-making) agent is not merely dependent on
applying a set of general principles or rules, but on showing the capacity to
98 For an illuminating reconstruction of this doctrine, see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY (2007).
99 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1988).
100 There is an increasing interest in exploring the impact of the lack of diversity in the
composition of courts (both domestic and international). See, e.g., Nienke Grossman, Sex on
the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of International Courts? 12 CHICAGO J.
INT’L L. 647 (2012). See also UK LABOUR PARTY REPORT, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY: ACCELERATING
CHANGE, available at http://ukscblog.com/judicial-diversity-accelerating-change-report-
published.
101 See Maksymilian Del Mar, Judging Virtuously: Developing an Emphatic Capacity for
Perceptual Sensitivity, 5 JURISPRUDENCE 177 (2014).
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recognise the salient features of a given situation102 – and, I would add, of
attributing legal salience to certain social facts and symbols.
Empathy might play a crucial role in conflicts involving cultural minorities,
especially when it comes to judging unfamiliar behaviour or practises that are
typically attributed to “other” cultures. Yet, the capacity to show empathy might
not come as an effortless skill. Unlike what the term might suggest at first sight,
the point is not primarily one of developing an emotional identification leading
to sympathizing with the feelings of minority litigants, as this might damage
impartiality, too. Rather, as Maks Del Mar stresses, empathy is not just an
affective state, but has an important cognitive dimension as well.103 This dimen-
sion can be significantly abridged if the adjudicator is not critically aware of the
likely presence of biases or prejudices, or if she is insufficiently attentive or alert
to the social contempt against certain identities.
The problem, in brief, is one of adjudicators being less mindful, and hence
less objective and impartial, in assessing the claims of minority litigants, as their
capacity to be responsive to their “otherness,” and to assess their reasons fairly,
might simply be impaired by their position as members of the dominant culture.
As a result, judgments might replicate, and contribute to solidifying, existing
social prejudices. Moreover, to the extent that minorities perceive the judicial
processes (or the outcomes) as biased against their identities, this will have
negative impact on the perception of the legitimacy and the authority of public
courts.
In addition to these general concerns about impartiality, two other potential
limitations to the litigation strategy are relevant:
First, in light of existing institutional constraints – both procedural and
substantive – minorities should not overestimate what courts can achieve.
Judges are not legislators, and are required to act as legal rather than as
moral agents. In order to preserve democracy and the rule of law, their institu-
tional function is circumscribed to interpreting and applying legally binding
norms.104 Hence, in adjudicating a given dispute, they are simply not allowed to
ground their decisions on their own ideas about what is fair or just, but on
arguments that constitute a valid legal justification.
Certainly, human rights norms and fundamental rights are typically
expressed through abstract and vague clauses that incorporate contested
102 Amalia Amaya, The Role of Virtue in Legal Justification, in LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE 51
(Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds., 2013).
103 See Del Mar, supra note 101.
104 A map of the relations between democracy and courts and the ways in which democracy
shapes adjudication, see JUDITH RESNICK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE (2011).
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concepts. In this context of judicial discretion, adjudicators could certainly
adopt a more activist position, based on the development of an emphatic
concern for the particular experience of the minority claimant, with the aim of
upholding minority rights. But judges cannot create new legal rights, and leave
legal rules out altogether, as their job consists in interpreting and applying
existing law (domestic or international), which, as noted before, has, for the
most part, not yet incorporated the multiculturalism paradigm.
Second, the idea that public adjudication can further the democratic inclu-
sion of marginalised groups tends to ignore the fact that judicial disputes take
the form of contradictory processes. When demands of identity that transcend
the individual case are at stake, these processes can magnify cultural divides
and exacerbate the sense of mutual distrust and disaffection. Moreover, as noted
above, if the reasoning of judges, or the outcomes of adjudication, are perceived
by minority litigants as biased or prejudiced against their identities, this percep-
tion can be detrimental to the very authority of the courts. Minorities might then
seek to withdraw from mainstream institutions, including public adjudicatory
processes, and create their own systems of regulation and adjudication.
An Illustration: Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights in Cases concerning Bans on Veils
A brief review of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence (herein-
after, ECtHR or “the Court”) in cases involving state laws banning Islamic
headscarves might be useful to illuminate the limitations of minority litigation
just outlined. Offering a comprehensive account of the jurisprudential develop-
ment on freedom of religion in Europe would require an extensive investigation
that is not possible here.105 The restricted focus on a few ECtHR cases is thus
merely aimed at illustrating those constraints. Certainly, as an international
body, the Strasbourg court faces specific institutional limitations that have to
be acknowledged.106 Nevertheless, unlike other international tribunals, the
Court has come to acquire a privileged and influential position in Europe,
more similar to that of a supra-national constitutional court. This means that
the judgments it produces are crucially relevant for the interpretation of domes-
105 See NORMAN DOE, LAW AND RELIGION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION (2011);
RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010).
106 See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS (J. Christoffersen
& M. Rask Madsen eds., 2011).
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tic and international human rights law.107 In addition, the internal composition
of the Court reflects the lack of ethnocultural diversity, which, as noted, is
common among high level domestic courts and international tribunals.108
Going back to the judicial conflicts emerging from state-imposed restrictions
to the wearing of Muslim headscarves, in a line of well documented cases, the
Court has taken a decisive stance in favour of the state interest to ban certain
religious symbols or attire in the public sphere.109 As a result, the Contracting
States enjoy a broad discretion to interfere legitimately in the public expression
of religious beliefs, through the adoption of specific prohibitions and sanctions.
The acceptance of restrictions on the individual right to manifest religion recog-
nised in the European Convention of Human Rights110 (hereinafter ECHR) has
been justified on different grounds, including the preservation of the “public
order,” “public safety,” and “the rights and freedoms of others.” Under such
generic restrictions, the Court has referred to the overriding right of the state to
shape public education and the public sphere; also, to the need of guaranteeing
gender equality and preserving secularism.
From the perspective of the limits of minority litigation, we should first note
that the predominant judicial framing in terms of individual rights in conflict
already obscures the broader ethnocultural dimension of disputes on head-
scarves, including its historical and socio-political roots. At the outset, the
Court is presented with what they see as a familiar legal challenge of demarcat-
ing the legitimate exercise of the individual right to freedom of religion in the
face of competing claims – equality and non-discrimination, health and security,
107 I focus here on the ECtHR as the court of final appeal on rights-related issues, and I leave
aside the institutional complexities stemming from its character as an international court
insofar as they are not central to understanding its substantive reasoning. For reasons of
space, I do not discuss the treatment of the issue by domestic courts, in which the European
cases originated.
108 On the procedure of appointment, still largely centred on nominations by national
governments, see Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Election of Judges, available
at http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/as-jur/echr-judges-election. Critical accounts can be
found in SELECTING EUROPE’S JUDGES (M. Bobek ed., 2015).
109 I focus here on decisions in which the Court has considered the compatibility of headscarf
bans with the right to freedom of religion and other rights recognised in the ECHR: Dahlab v.
Switzerland, Application no. 42393/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (2001); Leyla Şahin v. Turkey,
App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (G.C.); Dogru v. France, Application no. 27058/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) and Kervanci v. France, Application no. 31645/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1579 (2008);
S.A.S v. France, Application no. 43835/11, July 1, 2014.
110 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol 3, Sept. 21, 1970, Eur. T.S No. 45, Protocol
5, Dec. 20, 1971, Eur. T.S. No. 55 and Protocol 8, Jan. 1, 1990, Eur. T.S No 118 [hereinafter ECHR].
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public order and so forth. However, this legal framework obscures considera-
tions about group inequalities, domination, and structural discrimination, which
transcend the discreet individual case at hand. Thus, not much consideration is
given to the minority group’s perception or likely reaction to the process and
judgment. Moreover, contestation (inter and intra-cultural) about the meaning of
the symbol or practice often remains blurred in the judicial context. This
increases the risk of gender and ethnic bias, especially when courts fail to
explore the symbols or practices at stake in all their complexity and simply
endorse the predominant interpretation as authoritative.
Take, for instance, the most recent case of S.A.S. v. France, which challenged
the French “burqa ban” on wearing face coverings in public spaces. The Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR. held that the absolute prohibition of the concealment of
a person’s face in public did not violate the ECHR. The applicant was a practi-
cing Muslim living in France who declared her occasional choice to wear
religious clothing that conceals her face, such as a burqa or a niqab. She claimed
that the 2011 law prohibiting the concealment of a person’s face prohibited her
from wearing religious clothing of her choosing and violated her rights under
Articles 3 (cruel and degrading treatment), 8 (private life), 9 (freedom of reli-
gion), 10 (freedom of expression), and 11 (freedom of assembly and association)
of the ECHR separately and in conjunction with Article 14 (freedom from dis-
crimination).111 After declaring inadmissible the applicant’s claims under articles
3 and 11, the Court focused principally on the compatibility of the French law
with Articles 8 and Article 9 of the Convention. The ban, it found, interferes
with, and limits, the exercise of these rights. Yet the State asserted, and the
Court accepted, that such interference was justified as it pursued two “legitimate
aims” that were “necessary in a democratic society”: “public safety,” and
“respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.”112
With regard to the first justification, the Court found that a blanket ban on
full face covering would only be proportionate in the case of a general threat,
which the French government did not demonstrate.113 Still, the Court acknowl-
edged that the French legislature intended to address issues of public safety that
may arise from the concealment of faces in public. To this extent, the judgment
contributes to legitimizing, de facto, the feelings of “lack of safety” or “uneasi-
ness” associated with the veils, and the general suspicion of headscarves and
other minority symbols. As the explanatory memorandum to the French Law
explicitly states: “the wearing of the full veil is the sectarian manifestation of a
111 S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, paras. 3, 10–14.
112 Id. paras. 110–22.
113 Id. para. 139.
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rejection of the values of the Republic” and “brings with it a symbolic and
dehumanizing violence.”114 Yet, as noted in the joint partly dissenting opinion of
Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, those feelings and fears are not directly
linked to the veil itself, which can hardly be perceived as aggressive, but to
the “interpretations of its symbolic meaning.”115 The ruling, however, fails to
critically assess this widespread interpretation, and thus automatically privi-
leges the radical significance that the state attributes to the full veil symbol (as
potentially threatening public safety) in detriment to the alternative meaning
endorsed by the claimant (who claims that her choice to wear the full-face veil is
neither aimed at offending or threatening others, but “to feel at inner peace with
herself”116).
This point becomes even more crucial when it comes to the analysis of the
State’s second justification, which is not explicitly listed in the Convention as an
acceptable reason for restricting individual rights. Nevertheless, the Court draws
a connection between the notions of “living together” and “respect for the
minimum requirements of life in society” with the legitimate aim of the “protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others.”117 The majority thought that the
impugned ban could be regarded as justified, as it seeks to guarantee the
preconditions of “living together”; and “a State may find it essential to give
particular weight in this connection to the interaction between individuals and
may consider this to be adversely affected by the fact that some conceal their
faces in public places.”118
But once again, in deciding that wearing clothing that conceals the face in
public is incompatible with “the ground rules of social communication,”119 the
Court seems to be automatically privileging the conception and forms of inter-
personal exchange that are accepted as “normal” and as an expression of
“tolerance and broadmindedness” by the dominant culture to which the judges
themselves belong.120
Certainly, as in other controversial cases, the Court practices a largely
unconstrained deference to the state assessment, framed in terms of its well-
114 Id. para. 25.
115 Id. para. 8 (Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom jointly partly dissenting).
116 Id. para. 12.
117 Id. para. 121. This is explicitly listed in ECHR, supra note 110, arts. 8 & 9 (para. 2 of each).
118 Id. para. 141.
119 Id. paras. 153–54.
120 The separate opinion by Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom regards public communication
as a right, not a duty; the interference, they think, is disproportionate because it affects intimate
rights related to identity and personality. See S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, para. 9 (Judges
Nussberger and Jäderblom partially dissenting).
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known “margin of appreciation” doctrine.121 This doctrine is based on the idea
that the State is “in principle better placed than an international court to
evaluate local needs and conditions,”122 especially in cases where the Council
of Europe Members States display a lack of consensus. Yet, in judicial cases that
critically confront majority and minority cultures, unless a stricter test of pro-
portionality is undertaken,123 the prudential subsidiary role asserted by the
Court might have the effect of reinforcing domestic majoritarianism, instead of
pluralism, thus privileging collective goals over the rights of members of min-
ority cultures.
In a nutshell, judicial decision-making in cases involving minority litigants
runs the risk of ignoring the complex and multifaceted dimensions of a given
practice or symbol – a risk that might be even accentuated when conflicts are
decided in the context of international human rights courts facing additional
institutional constraints. On the one hand, the judges’ own ethnic or cultural
biases (consciously or unconsciously) can led them to overlook the contesta-
tion surrounding a particular cultural or religious symbol or practice, and
instead accept the most radical or extreme meanings that the majority culture
attaches to them (such as the veil’s intrinsic offensiveness); on the other hand,
the inherent institutional constraints of judicial controversies (such as the
typical “rights in conflict” framing) usually obscures the collective and multi-
faceted dimensions of conflicts involving minority cultures, as well as the
impact of a given ruling in reinforcing the domination of one cultural group
over the other.
As the account in the previous section shows, there is much more than veils
involved in the public debate that has led to these judicial battles. Minority
litigants are not merely claiming their right to manifest their religious belief;
they are also making a statement about identity and non-discrimination. By
overlooking the particular collective impact of bans such as the one described on
the position of a given group in society (for instance, accentuating their margin-
alisation), public adjudication systems can actually foster the hardening of the
conflict as well as the sense of distrust and vulnerability felt by members in
minority groups.
121 See, George Letsas, TwoConcepts of theMargin of Appreciation, 26OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 705 (2006).
122 S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, para. 129. This jurisprudential doctrine originates in
Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. 5493/72, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
123 The dissenting judges in the S.A.S case not only challenge the proportionality of the ban,
but they also argue that the State should not have been granted such a broad margin of
appreciation. S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, paras. 13–24 (Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom
partially dissenting).
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In truth, the ECtHR has started to display certain awareness of these pro-
blems. Hence, in the S.A.S case, it acknowledges that the blanket ban might be
too broad and, despite its formal neutrality, primarily affects Muslim women and
is regarded as disproportionate by a large number of international and domestic
actors.124 But the judgment ultimately diminishes the significance of these
factors by asserting that the ban was not intended to target Muslim women (a
dubious contention, taking into account certain Islamophobic remarks that
preceded its adoption), that the penalty for a violation is relatively minor, and
that it ultimately corresponds to the state, portrayed as a “neutral and impartial
organiser of the exercise of various religions,”125 to strike a balance between the
potential rights at stake in its society.126
Beyond the case just explored, the ECtHR jurisprudence on veils also brings
to light the risk of reinforcing prejudices against unpopular minorities. Thus, in
the judgments of Dogru and Kervanci (both applications against France for
banning the headscarf in physical education and sports classes) the ECtHR.
avoids scrutinising whether the restrictions were necessary to protect health
(hygiene) and safety and uncritically accepts that it is “reasonable” to think
so, without further factual investigation. It also stresses that the local dispute
over headscarves had created a “general atmosphere of tension,” implying that
minorities were somehow responsible for this anxiety, instead of considering
that they might be in fact victims of discriminatory stereotypes.127
As regards gender biases, the S.A.S decision crucially appears to reject the
previous jurisprudence in the cases of Dahlab and Sahin, where the Court seems
to endorse the representation of headscarves as symbols of female subordina-
tion, and therefore portrays the wearing of this garment by two adult women as
an implicit acceptance of gender inequality.128 These contested associations
were a crucial part of the reasoning that led the Court to uphold the measures
adopted by the Swiss and Turkish governments, respectively.129 In the Dahlab
case, the applicant was a Swiss primary school teacher who was requested to
take off her headscarf while performing her teaching duties. The headscarf was
deemed incompatible with the Canton of Geneva Public Education Act, which
124 S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, paras. 145–46.
125 Id. para. 127.
126 Id. paras. 151–52, 154.
127 See Dogru v. France, supra note 109 and Kervanci v. France, supra note 109, paras. 13, 74.
128 Instead, in S.A.S, the Court rejects as erroneous the suggestion that the ban is primarily
concerned with protecting gender equality and remains unconvinced that women who wear the
full-face veil do so under coercion or duress. See S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, paras. 118–19, 137.
129 For a critical stance, see Jill Marshall, Conditions for Freedom? European Human Rights Law
and the Islamic Headscarf Debate, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 631 (2008).
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requires the public education system to respect pupils’ and parents’ political and
religious beliefs. The ECtHR framed the issue as one of weighing the teacher’s
right to manifest her religion against the need to protect pupils “by preserving
religious harmony” (despite neither pupils, nor their parents, having com-
plained) and the judges agreed with the Swiss government that “it therefore
appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the
message of tolerance, respect for others, and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their
pupils.”130
In the case of Şahin, the applicant was a Turkish medical student at
Istambul University who, after having left to Vienna to continue her studies,
challenged the Turkish law banning the Islamic headscarf at universities and
other educational and state institutions under the European Convention, arguing
that her exclusion from university due to her insistence on wearing the head-
scarf violated her freedom of religion. The ECtHR also upheld the Turkish law:
All but one judge of the Grand Chamber accepted that, while the applicant’s
exclusion from university interfered with her freedom of religion, the interfer-
ence was justified, among other aims, to promote women’s equality.
Leaving aside the problem of neutrality, in both cases the Court accepts that
the headscarf stands for women’s inequality and portrays the choice of the
applicants as not fully autonomous, even though both are adult women who
declare that they freely decided to wear it. As a result, the state interference is
interpreted as discouraging a harmful choice, rather than as a disproportionate
restriction of a right. Yet this paternalistic impulse is based upon a mere suspi-
cion or abstract risk, which is not seriously substantiated throughout the judg-
ment. In Dahlab, the Court itself recognises that it is very difficult to determine
the impact of the headscarf on the freedom of religion or conscience of primary
school children, as it was uncontested that Ms. Dahlab had avoided engaging in
any action suspicious of proselytism.131 Still, the Court found that the veil results
from a prescription “difficult to reconcile with the principle of equality of the
sexes” and “with the message of tolerance, of respect for others and above all of
equality and non-discrimination that, in a democratic society, every teacher
must transmit to his or her pupils.”132
So, the headscarf is inscribed with a single symbolic meaning that excludes
alternative narratives, which entails taking at face value the abstract risk of
influencing or offending others invoked by the State, as well as the perils of
130 Dahlab v. Switzerland, supra note 109, at 13, sect.1.
131 Id. para. 13.
132 Id.
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radicalisation of beliefs (in Şahin133) and even of proselytism (a mere fear, yet
unsubstantiated, reproduced in both judgments134). Yet as John Stuart Mill
famously argued, a mere potential offence or harm to “society” cannot justify
the state interference in the freedom of individuals. The argument was promi-
nently used by H.L. Hart against Lord Devlin in their famous dispute on the
prohibition of homosexuality,135 and was rehearsed by Judge Tulkens in her solo
dissenting opinion in Şahin – where she argued that only irrefutable facts, “and
not mere worries or fears,” could justify the interference with a right guaranteed
by the ECHR.136
Finally, the arguments used by the Eur.Ct.H.R. are suspected of applying a
higher standard of scrutiny to practices typical of minority cultures, overlooking
the fact that many practices and customs of women in the dominant (self-styled
as liberal) society have also been informed by the internalisation of patriarchal
and discriminatory norms, which in turn keep supporting gender hierarchies
within the mainstream culture, too.137 So, even if Muslim women did wear the
headscarf out of a process of indoctrination, the Court’s reasoning would remain
problematic to the extent that the level of inspection of majority practices seems
less strict – and such double-standards clearly compromise fairness.138
Conclusion: Reclaiming the Political?
The first part of this article contends that the retreat of multiculturalism is quite
real, at least in Europe, and takes this fact as evidence that minority rights are
far from consolidated as genuine human rights. Although turning to courts is
an obvious move for minorities to reclaim what they took as morally justified
entitlements – rather than as mere legal exemptions granted out of toleration – I
have tried to show that there are obvious limitations in this strategy and, as a
consequence, the results might be rather disappointing for minority litigants.
133 Şahin, supra note 109, para. 109.
134 Dahlab, supra note 109, para. 13; Şahin, supra note 109, para. 108.
135 See H.L.A. Hart, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963), which was in part directed against the
argument at the basis of Lord Devlin’s THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
136 See Şahin (Judge Tulkens dissenting, para. 5); S.A.S v. France, supra note 109, para. 7
(Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom jointly partly dissenting).
137 Sarah Song, Majority Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
473 (2005).
138 See EISENBERG, supra note 82 (arguing when confronting conflicts of identity, judges
should be guided by a duty of “institutional humility” in order to avoid imposing more stringent
restrictions on members in minority group).
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The legal and political dispute over whether Muslim girls and women should
have the right to wear traditional headscarves in public spaces illuminates the
pitfalls of the predominant frameworks, centred as they are on individual rights.
As shown in the preceding section, there are serious concerns as to the fairness
of public adjudicatory processes and the ability of judges to engage the multi-
faceted dimensions of identity conflicts. The Eur.Ct.H.R.’s jurisprudence, for
instance, tends to ascribe Muslims values that contradict human rights and
liberal values, such as attributing a lesser role to women, and pursuing practices
that are regarded as segregationist or suspicious. It thus reinforces a static view
of the headscarf and of the Muslim identity that has been rejected by members of
this group, including women, but serves its purpose as an object of criticism and
to justify the prohibitionist approach; yet, by ignoring these different interpre-
tive levels, judges engage in a dogmatic application of biased particularistic
values in the name of defending human rights.
The courtroom, therefore, might prove an even less egalitarian framework
for contestation and protection of group related identity claims than the political
realm, as judicial procedures do not usually offer an adequate space for internal
contestation and inter-cultural dialogue. For these reasons, I agree with Vernon
Bogdanor in that “it is a mistake to overburden the judiciary by giving judges the
duty to resolve complex social problems, problems that they are ill-trained to
resolve.”139 Courts, as Bogdanor rightly contends, cannot be expected to deal
with the wider problems facing a multicultural society. There is the danger, as
this article has tried to show, that judicial disputes on sensitive cultural issues
end up having counterproductive effects, such as to solidify prevalent prejudices
against unpopular minorities, and to reaffirm hostility and resentment in
divided societies. Progressive multiculturalism should be preferably enhanced
through democratic political processes focused on the direct participation of
minorities and designed to meet the demands of inter-group justice in diverse
democracies.140 Such processes, however, should assume the equal moral stand-
ing of minority cultures, which is essential to empowering these groups as valid
interlocutors with genuine rights and the ability to shape the public space,
rather than just merely protecting or tolerating them. Eventually, such proce-
dures might help to overcome the oversimplified views and stereotypes about
minorities that dominate judicial (rights-based) approaches, and can produce
139 Vernon Bogdanor, Overcoming the Legacy of the 20th Century: Protecting Minorities in
Modern Democracies, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/120310546/Overcoming-the-
Legacy-of-the-20th-Century-Protecting-Minorities-in-Modern-Democracies.
140 See MONIQUE DEVEAUX, GENDER AND JUSTICE IN MULTICULTURAL LIBERAL STATES (2007).
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enduring settlements out of mutual recognition rather than just provisional
judicial victories.
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